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The First World War fundamentally altered the cotton ‘weaving belt’ areas of Lancashire, and 
was, despite a temporary reprieve in 1919/1920, to spell the start of a slow, painful, economic 
and social decline. The disruption of trade arising from the war ultimately commenced the 
transformation of an area that prided itself on its independence and ability to ‘make’ money, to 
one that by the 1930s both operatives and owners looked to escape.  As a reporter from the 
Burnley Express stated in 1930: ‘I have heard scores of millowners say, “happen what may, 
my son isn’t going in t’mill” a remarkable attitude in a county and industry where family 
tradition has always been strong.’1 
The cotton industry had, up until 1913, experienced an ‘Indian summer’,2 and in some 
towns it was still expanding.3 There was a steadfast belief in the long term viability of cotton 
and in the global importance of cotton towns. Socially, however, a number of issues had 
developed which had been masked by the positivity emanating from the industry itself. The 
impact of the short, sharp drop in productivity and disruption caused by the outbreak of war 
caused these issues to manifest across social relations locally, and confidence to erode. 
Therefore, the impact of the war in several ways polarised and split apart the communities of 
the area, challenging the established modes of life. 
The focus of this chapter is the impact of the war on the cotton operatives of the ‘world’s 
weaving centre’ Burnley,4  with reference to the surrounding districts.5 This chapter explores 
how the experience of war fundamentally challenged the local confidence in the cotton industry 
by primarily looking at the cornerstones of local life: the weaving family unit and trade 
unionism. Indeed, Burnley was regarded contemporarily to have suffered ‘more than any other 
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textile district’ from the First World War,6 and the aim here is to explore the key changes and 
events the outbreak of war sparked that left a lasting effect on labour. 
Little interest has been paid to the combined impact of international war in 1914-18 and 
the ensuing economic uncertainty upon the cotton weaving towns of north-east Lancashire in 
a social sense, although the decline of British cotton has been long debated.7 However, external 
issues in world markets and internal structural issues together removed the Lancastrian 
hegemony over cotton. As shown in Fig.1, the decline of cotton was dramatic, but for much of 
the interwar period this was seen as temporary. The impact that the process of decline had upon 
the weaving communities, focussed on the export market, therefore demands attention.  
Figure 1: World trade in cotton textiles (millions sq. yards/ 000 quintals) 8 
The industrial structure of north-east Lancashire was unique. In 1911, for example, the weaving 
districts employed around three times the amount of females (as a proportion of the population) 
than the national average.9 Weaving was also dominated by small manufacturers (rather than 
a small number of large manufacturers as in other industries), with the belief that the majority 
of mill owners had worked their way up from the ‘shop floor’.10 It was difficult for a collective 
identity to develop amongst the employer classes, and this sense of individual endeavour spread 
to operatives. The common belief was that ‘anyone’ could make their fortune in cotton through 
hard work and luck. This had two main effects. Firstly, it lessened class distinction, and as a 
result, created more opportunity for what Jeffrey Hill called ‘political action’.11 Secondly, it 
encouraged a community-wide engagement in both political and economic life. As such, this 
 1882 - 1884 1910 - 1913 1926 - 1928 1936 - 1938 
United Kingdom 4410 6650 3940 1720 
Europe 770 1900 2320 1490 
U.S.A 150 400 540 250 
India 50 90 170 200 
Japan … 200 1390 2510 
Other countries … 260 190 290 
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was reflected in both the wide-ranging labour movement, and the impetus for the Liberals to 
respond. In the less urbanised areas, there was a tendency to stay staunchly loyal to the Liberal 
Party, but within the larger population centres, there was great overlap between the Liberal-
Labour ideologies. The reliance upon liberal, laissez-faire ideals meant that the wider area was 
regarded as a ‘stronghold of liberalism’,12 mentally and politically. As Hill again describes, 
Burnley especially had a ‘radical tradition’ that remained strong and ‘presented a picture of the 
classic Victorian alliance of small owners and workers against the forces of privilege.’13 Unlike 
other northern industrial towns, it remained wedded to this particular Lancashire cotton spirit 
and epitomised the mentally that was described in 1928 by Ethel Dietrich: ‘it has acquired a 
proud tradition which is shared by employers, investors and operatives who have with their 
ancestors been born and bred in the industry. Nowhere have the shibboleths of laissez faire 
clung with such persistence until Lancashire individualism has become a byword’.14 In the 
midst of decline this bullish attitude had come to hinder the industry, but, in a practical sense, 
prior to the war, the collective spirit stood for more than just an individual, and extended to the 
family and local community units as the basis of local society.   
 
The impact of the war on family structure and the role of women 
Weaving dominated the local economy in north-east Lancashire.  In Burnley in 1915, out of a 
population of 106,000 around 40 per cent of male labour, and 76 per cent of female labour, was 
engaged in the cotton industry.15  The only other industries of note were coal mining and 
machine building, both of which were ancillaries to, and reliant upon, the fortunes of cotton. 
There had been little industrial diversification during the years prior to the First World War. In 
Nelson and to a lesser extent Colne, progress had been made through the incorporation of 
‘fancy’ or ‘fine’ cloths, which catered to several markets but, for the majority of the area, the 
staple good was  either ‘grey cloth’ or medium quality goods, produced for the export market. 
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Traditionally, operatives tended to live in walking distance from the mill in clusters 
surrounded by their own extended family. 16  The bonds of family and kinship were also 
reinforced, and amplified, within the mill environment. Family members were known to work 
alongside each other, with some sharing the looms. It was also common for multiple 
generations of families to work in the same mill, whilst the methods of training weavers 
entailed an apprenticeship to a family member, or by a ‘surrogate’. 17 The familial system was, 
in theory, mutually beneficial for operative and employer. For the latter, it served as a form of 
maintaining discipline, and creating a sense of loyalty to the mill. For the operatives it was the 
basis of the family wage, in that both parents and any children were expected to contribute to 
a combined income, which individually would be insufficient, but combined meant that the 
weaving districts were comparatively well paid compared other industrial communities. As 
well as providing for a higher combined total wage, this system encouraged forms of social 
security and encouraged savings, further complemented by local institutions such as the 
Cooperative. Due to the unique pay structure in Lancashire weaving districts, women were 
sometimes paid equally or close to men. As Hill argues, this meant that the status of women 
was not ‘structured in inferiority’, and gave them a ‘sense of importance and self-confidence.’18  
As was shown in a report into family wages in 1909, the averages between six weaving towns 
and six spinning towns highlighted that although male spinning operatives were paid on the 
whole nearly double female spinning operatives (31s 8d to 17s 4d) weavers were paid generally 
closer (28s 1d to 20s 8d) on average.19 In some towns, such as Nelson, women were paid closer 
to 30s per week.20  
Overall, the familial system created a patchwork of dependency, reinforcing 
community ties.21 The sense of mutual dependency extended into industrial relations, where 
the emphasis was on the ‘collective good’ of the industry. Since the acceptance of the 
Brooklands Agreement in 1893, the focus of industrial relations was the idea of the ‘joint 
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relationship’, and of maintaining stability.22 The familial system also permeated into most 
aspects of local society, and the self-confidence of women helped create what Michael Savage 
has called ‘a general equality’ between men and women at a level not seen outside of the 
county.23 Despite the more balanced, family based structure, Carol Morgan has argued that 
cotton women were not positioned ‘nor did they position themselves as equals.’24 They were 
however involved in decision making, both in the home and workplace. They had roles in trade 
disputes, local politics, and forms of ‘soft’ authority in respective spheres. 25  The system 
provided a cultural structure for communities which was stable, established, and passed on to 
future generations.26  
Women in north-east Lancashire had an active role economically and socially in 
everyday life. As Susan Pyecroft argues, the role of women nationally, in a general sense, 
before the war ‘reflected the traditional view that women’s work was of lesser value and 
therefore deserved lower pay.’27 She details a shift for women into more visible public roles 
and positions through the onset of war, and also from ‘hidden’ worlds including textile 
factories. Yet, the societal freedoms enjoyed by cotton operatives was different than in other 
parts of the country. One local newspaper report describing the popularity of hockey in 1914 
highlights the differences between the young female workers of Burnley and London, and 
reinforces the dominant local cultural identity: 
The Lancashire lass is not poor as girls go. To say that hockey is cheap would seem a 
mockery to a London factory hand. A set of London jam or match-factory girls could 
not hope to play such a game unless they were subsidised by kind ladies. Besides it 
would make them too hungry. The Lancashire girl can, if she will, organise and run a 
hockey club without charitable aid.28 
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The established familial system came under attack almost immediately from the 
outbreak of war.  The rivalry that developed between local male weavers and colliers to outdo 
each other’s recruitment figures meant a quick removal of males from the workplace, and a 
void socially, culturally and industrially. In addition, a number of men who did not enlist were 
requisitioned to other roles. For example the husband of leading female Labour figure Selina 
Cooper was moved to the local postal service.29 There thus existed a recalibration of the norm, 
which although expected under wartime conditions, was exacerbated by perceived external 
interference of ‘outside’ bodies.  
There grew a belief that those ‘outside’ of the area did not understand the situation, and 
if they did, simply did not care. One local survey in 1917 responded to the publication of a 
Board of Trade report into food prices by arguing that: 
To the wearied and worried housewife, frantically struggling to provide substantial and 
nutritive meals for her family, the estimate of the Board of Trade ... in the price of food 
… had little significance. Such estimates are of value chiefly to those whose business 
it is to represent human life in figures.30  
The lack of stable work, as mills closed with alarming frequency under declining trading 
conditions, removed a key element in the established coping mechanisms of the mill 
community and a shift to external solutions. Women had to adapt to performing a more 
outwardly authoritative role. For the older married women, there was a shift in emphasis to act 
as a solo breadwinner. Yet, although relief schemes were undertaken locally, these were 
generally aimed at men. Added to this, the drop in trade meant that the local union, the Burnley 
Weavers Association (BWA), could not issue any form of unemployment relief for long 
periods.31 The conditions in September 1914 deteriorated to the level where 5th Battalion of 
the East Lancashire Regiment sent unconsumed rations to distribute to needy families. 32  By 
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late August 1915, around 2,000 families needed relief from the Education Committee’s 
distribution of free meals.33  
Local initiatives were quickly set up to try and ease the burden. By 1916, the League 
of Social Service had developed alongside other cross-class organizations to counter the 
increased cost of living brought on by the war, with some run as a ‘municipal enterprise’ not 
for profit, but to feed young fatherless families.34 A particular focus was the number of ‘lonely 
women’ in the town who were offered companionship, entertainment and services such as letter 
writing and literacy classes. The most notable group was the little studied Tipperary Room 
movement, who specifically set out to create a support network for women and gained 
particular traction amongst the female industrial populations such as in London, Walsall, and 
Burnley. Set up originally in London in October 1914, as an ‘alternative public house’,35 the 
movement spread to north-east Lancashire with the opening of a room in Padiham in January 
1915,36 and then to Burnley in February of the same year, followed by two further rooms by 
April.37 
Despite the speed in which local initiatives mobilized, problems still existed that 
challenged the community. Burnley suffered from profiteering – with imported white flour, 
and the unscrupulous methods of acquisition a contentious issue. 38  The milk supply was 
generally inadequate, but yielded higher profits for farmers than before the war.39 Accusations 
were leveled at the local brewers’ inflating prices but they in turn blamed the ‘fanatical 
temperance groups’ whom they linked to conscientious objection. They sought to portray their 
industry as a vanguard against internal enemies and issued statements claiming that only their 
patriotism had stopped them downing tools in the face of agitation and ‘insults’.40  
In more practical terms, even if work had remained stable, the cost of living now far 
outstripped wages. Solutions were sought through precedent. Yet, the combination of 
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depression and war was a wholly new experience, and where kinship and workplace 
relationships had previously existed as a coping mechanism, these were now diminished. The 
usual solution, the Burnley Express suggested, was that: 
Men usually extricate themselves from similar situations by raising loans, and business 
men in like circumstances pay the increased prices and pass them on; but the housewife, 
however astute she may be, is unable to circumvent her difficulties in either of these 
ways … there is no Solomon among us to tell her by what sorcery she can transform 
her shrunken weekly income into the necessities of the household from Saturday to 
Saturday.41 
There existed a lack of practical strategy to cope with the situation, but the solutions proposed 
were increasingly women-led, and assertive. The Burnley Association for the Care of 
Friendless Girls, the Girls Friendly Society, and the League of Social Service, placed emphasis 
on serving a moral purpose, offering guidance and education to women in need. Many of the 
organizations had patriotic ideologies. The most famous example in Burnley was 12-year-old 
Jennie Jackson, who sold ‘comforts’ for soldiers dressed as ‘Young Kitchener’. The Girls 
Friendly Society described themselves as an ‘Imperial Society’,42 whilst The Tipperary Room 
movement was named after the famous song, and naturally through its links to the SSFA was 
adorned with Union flags. Patriotism, however, was a complex issue. There had long been a 
growing peace movement spearheaded by women that from 1917 grew louder in Nelson, and 
combined with a local ILP campaign to attempt to oust war hero and local MP Captain Albert 
Smith.43 The prominence of the peace movement, and the subsequent backlash against it, 
resulted in ‘stormy scenes’ that had not been witnessed before.44 In Burnley, Philip Morrell, a 
key figure in the Union of Democratic Control and outspoken pacifist stood down in 1918 after 
the local Liberal Association withdrew their support for him.45 
9 
 
The increased assertiveness by women is evidenced by the amount of lectures and 
events held that focused on the active role women would play politically after the war. A 
discussion held by the Padiham Women’s Emergency Association in February 1915 perhaps 
best summarized this shift by arguing that ‘The coming generation needed them. This was 
England’s call to Englishwomen.’46 
The challenges to trade unionism and labour 
The anti-war movement was linked to an undercurrent still actively engaged in women’s 
suffrage. Some groups in some geographical areas had ceased activities during the war, and 
indeed softened their ideological position as a sacrifice.47 Yet in others, such as in Nelson, 
women campaigners took a more visibly prominent role. The increased female presence in the 
public arena resulted in successes locally in women’s issues such as local facilities for 
maternity, and women’s health more generally. Overall, in Nelson there developed an 
‘incoherent’ mixture of ideologies invested in three broad areas: firstly, conscription and the 
treatment of conscientious objectors, secondly, maternity, infant welfare and women’s health 
and thirdly, the peace process.48  
Despite women’s causes gaining more attention, the main political forum was within 
the trade union. Women comprised the majority of members but they did not hold positions of 
‘hard’ authority. At times, dislocation existed between the female weaving body and the male 
leadership.49  Within the mill, tacklers and overlookers were universally men, and again were 
often recruited through familial patronage, further reinforcing a male dominance over the 
majority female operative force.50 Trade union leadership was also overwhelmingly male, and 
as Alan Fowler has argued, officials were selected on their numerical calculating ability, which 
through the burden of mill and home roles excluded women. 51  They were, however, 
comparatively more involved than their female counterparts in the spinning section, and did 
exert ‘soft’ authority in other spheres outside of the mill. Due to the federal nature of cotton 
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trade unionism, the strength of the Amalgamated Weavers Association (AWA) was reliant on 
the dominance of local associations. There was thus at times a lack of central control if local 
issues took precedence. The main rank-and-file could also direct policy and action through 
sheer size at times, and did so in the period prior to the First World War.52 
The primary issue that affected all operatives was the protection and advancement of 
wages. As Joseph L. White has shown, the frequency of strikes in weaving to perceived attacks 
on wages is very clear.53 From the turn of the century, concerns grew amongst the weavers that 
wages were under attack on two fronts. One was the increasing use of poor quality materials, 
which due to the fining system in place for poor work reduced wages. Second was the continued 
existence of non-union workers, which it was believed both undermined the collective strength 
of the AWA, and allowed said workers to benefit from the efforts of trade unionism without 
contribution.  
A change of leadership for the AWA witnessed an ideological shift leftward around 
1910, and increasingly close links to the Labour Party were forged in local districts. This was 
driven by local associations - especially in Nelson - and from rank and file members. By 1911 
unofficial strikes outnumbered official ones by six to one, and in north-east Lancashire were 
characterized by a new militancy.54 The result strengthened the membership and created ‘a 
climate akin to a religious revival’.55 As was argued by AWA Secretary Joseph Cross who was 
elected in 1906, such enthusiasm was encouraged. He stated that: 
In these days it is absolutely necessary for the workman to take a direct hand in politics 
and make sure that his wants and needs shall receive full attention and satisfaction at 
the hands of the legislators.56 
The AWA attempted to utilize this growing enthusiasm, and support its campaign for wage 
increases by unionizing non-union mills and districts.57 In 1911 the General Council of the 
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AWA made the decision to financially support local districts in mills with over 85 per cent 
union membership in refusing to work with non-unionists. 58  The result, after months of 
agitation, was the threat of lockout from employers. When an agreement could not be reached, 
the Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers Association (CSMA) carried out their threat in 1912.  
The ‘great lockout’ caused the first real mass dislocation of the workforce since the 
Lancashire cotton famine of 1861-65, but had two further reaching effects. Firstly, it pitted 
operative against employer, breaking the notion of effective collective bargaining, in a battle 
of conditions that the operatives lost. But secondly it pitted operatives (and groups of 
operatives) against each other, victimising those who wished to remain outside of the union, 
for example the Catholic Workers Union in Nelson. More importantly it empowered rank and 
file unionists to act on their own volition in certain areas, and in Colne and Nelson wildcat 
agitation continued long after the lockout was settled.59 Therefore, unlike in areas to the south 
of the weaving district, where, like Burnley, settlement was treated with ‘genuine relief and 
thankfulness’,60 certain pockets of operatives came out of the dispute with a newfound strength 
and confidence in local collective action. In regard to Nelson, Hill notes that ‘there is little 
doubt that Nelson weavers were in no mood to be dictated to by either employers or union 
leaders.’ 61  White summarises the lockout as part of a wider movement that ‘marked a 
continuation of the workers’ propensity to weave a small, dense pattern of strikes fought over 
local and immediate issues.’62 
The immediate decline in working conditions and hence wages that the First World War 
brought therefore created a great deal of pressure upon the AWA to reaffirm its importance. 
The AWA’s main focus was the cost of living and wage increases. Yet following victory in the 
lockout, the CSMA and local employers were now a more cohesive body. Shortly before the 
outbreak of war it was decided, with the operatives’ input, to operate on ‘short time’- closing 
for four out of sixteen weeks between the February and June 1914 – a decision that left the 
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manufacturers in Manchester ‘frankly astonished by the unanimity displayed by the members 
of the Burnley Manufacturers’ Association.’ 63  However the newfound unity of the 
manufacturers contrasted with operatives being exposed to uneven and reduced working hours. 
The AWA pressured the Board of Trade to utilise the Unemployment Insurance Act of 1912, 
and managed to have Emergency Grants made. 64  The emphasis rested with the local 
associations who were financially hamstrung, and in Burnley’s case making weekly losses of 
around £600. 65 
One suggestion to alleviate the distress was that the mills of north-east Lancashire 
should switch to khaki. However, several issues remained. The machines would be able to 
weave cotton khaki, but not woollen khaki, and the amount able to do this would only be small 
(estimated to be 5,000 out of 60,000 looms). The looms in Nelson and Colne, already 
exchanged and adapted for materials such as sateen, were too light to use. The Yorkshire 
woollen industry in most cases had the spinning and weaving sectors combined (unlike the 
areas of specialization in Lancashire), which would require those in Nelson to acquire the yarn 
from Yorkshire. There was thus a preference to maintain the separation of cotton and woollen, 
and merchants were wary of upsetting the status-quo.66 Adaptation needed funds and although 
some mills did seek to modify their looms, the possibility of damage to the machinery through 
weaving heavier material created further potential economic outlay. For operatives there was 
also the psychological element of ‘giving up’ on cotton.  
One possible solution with governmental support was for weavers in depressed areas 
to migrate to the areas of the West Riding of Yorkshire, where operatives were needed through 
shortages and nightshift work in khaki weaving.67 Yet there were no signs of a collective effort. 
Firstly, the wages for Yorkshire weavers were lower than in Lancashire by around 30 per cent, 
and secondly, the lodging houses, taking advantage of the situation, began charging 
extortionate rates. As the Burnley Express argued: ‘Burnley weavers who have gone over the 
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border have actually returned home poorer in pocket than when they went, and as they say, 
they might as well stay at home idle, as they would not be any worse off.’68 Other attempts to 
get Burnley weavers to migrate or adapt failed. In November 1915, the mills of Rochdale 
launched appeals to fill the lack of female operatives, with high wages and ‘irreproachable 
working conditions’ to juveniles and older women.69 A solution that found favour with both 
the Burnley and Nelson Weavers’ Associations was the idea of equipping the army with 
corduroy uniforms, although this again failed to come to fruition.70 
The main focus for the AWA was the pursuit of wage increases or a war bonus. From 
February 1915 as conditions showed tentative signs of improvement, the AWA began to pursue 
wage advances. For the operatives, there was a joint belief that war bonuses were deserved for 
their efforts, but more importantly that a wage increase to meet the cost of living was also long 
overdue. 71  The plea was declined, but as the Burnley Express explained there was a local 
belief that ‘no section of the community has been so hard hit as the cotton operatives.’72 A 
further application in March for a war bonus on wages was rejected ‘owing to the unprofitable 
and depressed state of business.’73 The spinning section, threatening to cause another lockout 
across the industry, managed to achieve their goal of wage advance in July 1915. Their success 
offered the weaving operatives encouragement, but also caused resentment at being 
overlooked. The requests were rejected yet again. To add to this setback, the CSMA issued the 
threat in August 1915 that if depression continued then wages would be reduced.74  
The AWA were accused of ineffectiveness, and of detachment from the issues affecting 
everyday operative. In response, they shifted focus to other ‘enemies’. In an attempt to finally 
conquer the presence of non-unionists, they launched strike action in the nearby weaving 
village of Harle Syke, one of the ‘out-districts’ that had operated outside of both the AWA and 
CSMA. As a smaller village, a number of the workers were shareholders in the mills in which 
they worked and in exchange for stable, regular work with dividends, accepted lower wages. 
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These were due to the ‘local disadvantages’ of incurring extra transport charges from being 
more remote. The BWA had maintained a long campaign in Harle Syke over the previous years 
with mixed results but had reached by their own estimates 60 per cent membership of the 
operatives working there by August 1915.75  
In August 1915 a rally was held in Burnley to discuss the efforts of the AWA towards 
the war bonus, the progress in unionising Harle Syke, and to single out the weavers there as 
the reason for any bonus being withheld. Leading figures from the AWA openly attacked Harle 
Syke, and portrayed the operatives there as internal enemies. One speech argued that:  
Harle Syke is the only place that said ‘we won’t recognise your union’. Either the Harle 
Syke employer was superhuman in his majesty or the weaver a little below human in 
his capacity. Either Harle Syke was right and the rest of the county wrong, or Harle 
Syke was wrong and the rest of the county right ... the weaver who really had British 
blood in his or her veins would refuse to accept German methods either from German 
soldiers or English employers … the policy of terrorism would be no more successful 
than the policy of non-recognition of the union ... a soldier who ran away would be a 
coward for life, weavers who didn’t strike would be a knobstick for life.76 
On August 18th a further application for 5% wage advance was rejected. A day later, the AWA 
handed in 1200 notices between the eleven companies in Harle Syke. The strike eventually 
lasted for eight months, but is indicative of the divisions that developed across the local 
communities of north-east Lancashire. Great emphasis was placed on the financial strength of 
Harle Syke compared to other districts, and people from across the class spectrum and across 
north-east Lancashire wrote to the local press to argue the merits and negative aspects of the 
system that was in place there.  
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Strikebreaking weavers were assaulted and intimidated, pitched battles were waged 
with weavers travelling from neighbouring districts to the bus terminus, and as Roland Kippax, 
a child at the time recalled, the notion of the Harle Syke weavers being traitors was a constant 
motif. He recalled the placards produced:  
One of these showed a little girl asking her dad ‘What did you do in the Great War, 
Daddy?’ The Weavers' Union taking advantage of this, made a copy which said ‘What 
did you do in the Harle Syke strike, Daddy?’ And in large capital letters they added 
KNOBSTICK. These were handed out and pushed through letter boxes of people they 
knew were working.77 
For the weavers of Harle Syke, the strike was an attempt to protect a local working environment 
that had shielded the village from the harsher aspects of the downturn. The mills divided work 
across the companies, and through sourcing labour from retired locals and working out shift 
patterns across extended family members, never totally ceased work. The action was 
undertaken with direct operative input, and they exercised an individualism at odds with the 
wider collective spirit of the cotton industry. Indeed, at one point when the Harle Syke weavers 
heard rumours that the local employers had agreed to end the strike with various concessions 
to the AWA, they launched a counter-strike, downing tools through the indignation at having 
not been consulted. The Burnley Express noted this was ‘Gilbertian in its ludicrousness’ as now 
non-unionists were striking against the strike, which, it was argued, was effectively being 
fought to grant the weavers in Harle Syke higher wages.78 The collective spirit in Harle Syke 
delayed any possible solution for several months. The Harle Syke employers were reluctant to 
guarantee the remittance of striking operatives – the majority of whom likely came from 
outside of the village.   
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The eventual settlement in Harle Syke in March 1916 after 30 weeks was felt to be a 
compromise, and further damaged the credibility of the BWA and AWA. Operatives did 
receive a small concession of 5 per cent war bonus in November 1915,79 but with the threat of 
reductions dependent on trade. The strike cost around £1,000 per week, with half of the amount 
being met by the AWA. Although Harle Syke now recognised the AWA, they in turn had their 
own special status as having ‘local disadvantages’ recognised, and their desire to pay lower 
wages accepted.80 The BWA also launched attacks against other internal ‘enemies’ in their 
fight against the cost of living. As has previously been discussed, profiteering locally had 
become a major issue. The BWA thus publicly attacked the ‘unscrupulous profit-makers’, and 
in February 1915, in their quarterly report asked: ‘The German who is at war with us we shoot. 
What shall we do with the British profiteer?’81 
Despite the blustering rhetoric, the effectiveness of the AWA diminished as the war 
progressed. The introduction of the Cotton Control Board in 1917 was direct governmental 
regulation which significantly altered both orders and working patterns.82 It also crucially took 
the emphasis away from the local weaving associations. The decline of influence from the 
BWA and in turn the AWA, as well as the notable resentment towards employers was perhaps 
best articulated in a letter to the Burnley Express in the midst of the Harle Syke strike. ‘A 
Worker’ argued: 
…who is responsible for the Harle Syke strike? The Weavers? No because a large 
number of them did not want to come out; they were quite satisfied and would rather 
have a little less money and a bit better work than some of the places in Burnley, where 
they have to pay extra to get the work done. No it is the Burnley manufacturers who are 
at the bottom of it all. They do not like to see the Harle Syke people get on, and as for 
the workers missing out on the war bonus, that is all bluff, because the masters never 
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dreamt of paying one. But it served their purpose to bring Harle Syke in as their excuse 
… the union have for once been the tool of their masters.83 
 
The shift in confidence and the post-war mentality 
The post-war recovery and speculative boom created a new confidence in cotton, manifested 
in 1919-1920 through the purchasing of mill shares in the area mostly by absentee speculators, 
paid for with raised prices to cover debts.84 Such action was condemned in many circles as the 
end of ‘paternalistic capitalism’, and by 1928 it was felt that ‘nothing worse could have 
happened to the industry.’ 85  Crucially, it removed the shared sense of ownership and 
participation from the operatives. 
In 1919, employment was still generally unstable.86 There was consequently little work 
for returning soldiers, of which Burnley had the third highest number in Lancashire behind 
Manchester and Liverpool.87 Yet municipally the investment from speculators created a sense 
of optimism in some quarters that a form of utopia could be built. Investment in other local 
industries such as building and machinery etc. was undertaken, and profits rose, dividends 
increased and borrowing and investing were recklessly encouraged. Burnley looked forward to 
a period of economic prosperity and industrial peace. Redevelopment programmes were 
proposed to run into the early 1920s, 88 whilst attempts to rebuild local community came 
through schemes to unite people. Municipal coal distribution, municipal banks handling cheap 
loans, and municipally owned weaving concerns were all suggested alongside the extension of 
road building schemes.89 However, this dawn was a false one in two respects. Firstly, the 
effects largely failed to be felt by operatives. Secondly, by 1921 the demand for cotton was all 
but satisfied: profits fell and interest charges mounted in the face of dropping dividends and 
investments. The message from employers was of cuts to return to pre-war wage levels, and by 
18 
 
1922, there was a total reduction in list prices of 120 per cent, effectively bringing wages back 
down to the level of 1914. Altogether operatives suffered wage reductions in 1921, 1922, 1929, 
1932 and 1935. 90 Labour MP for Clitheroe Alfred Davis summarised the feeling locally: ‘the 
great forces of wealth and capital were uniting to try and get the workers down to worse 
conditions of life.’91 
The AWA never again achieved the stable membership figures it did during the war. In 
1914, their membership stood at 197,957, and through the decrease in employment and rising 
disillusionment, dropped to 169,172 in 1924 and by 1944 had shrunk to 72,556.92 Operatives 
were polarized, and in Burnley the National Unemployed Workers Committee Movement 
became a prominent force in the early 1930s. In Nelson, the same process of an ideological 
shift leftwards resulted in the town being regarded as a ‘Little Moscow’, and at one point there 
was the very serious possibility of the Nelson Weavers Association forming a breakaway 
union.93 In contrast, the Labour Party strengthened its position in north-east Lancashire, and 
through the elections of Dan Irving in Burnley, Alfred Davis in Clitheroe and Albert Smith in 
Nelson and Colne together created an enclave in a Lancashire overwhelmingly behind coalition 
Conservative and Liberal candidates.94 Labour held both Burnley and Nelson until 1931, when 
a decade of trade downturn and a series of industrial unrest over attempts to modernise the 
industry resulted in the ‘more looms dispute’.95 The shift towards parliamentary democracy 
over trade unionism and municipal politics meant that Labour suffered ‘routs’ in the early 
1920s that took almost a decade to reverse in both Burnley and Nelson.96  
Conclusions 
The impact of the First World War on the labouring classes of north-east Lancashire were 
mixed, but it is clear that the event fundamentally altered societal structure.  The war years, 
especially in the case of Burnley, were to be the start of a long, slow and painful decline. 
Community structure and work patterns were changed, and the cultural norms that had been 
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the basis of local life were seriously challenged. Long lasting rifts were forged and amplified 
through trying conditions, and although people did band together, dissent did not disappear 
with the war. The perceived mistreatment that weaving operatives received both internally and 
externally created a large degree of mistrust. The attempts to rectify this and heal the cotton 
communities largely failed, and as the industry proceeded into a decade of downturn, it became 
increasingly unstable, economically and socially. Many of these problems pre-date the war, but 
there is little doubt that the outbreak of conflict accelerated and created new divisions. 
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